mediterranean migration
blue borders


Tightening the EU’s External Borders: The Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations 


Jürg Martin Gabriel

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich (ETHZ)

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2852982

October 2016

 

Introduction

In the past two years, the EU has been confronted with a massive flow of migrants and refugees across the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. To meet the challenge various efforts were made to reinforce the Union’s external borders, more precisely those of the Schengen Area. The measures introduced are bound to affect Euro-Mediterranean relations or, as the EU sees it, relations with its southern neighborhood. As I want to show in this paper, the results are mixed. Border tightening creates some new barriers between the Union and its neighbors but, as the EU soon realized, effective border management, whether on land or at sea, cannot be done alone. It requires some degree of cooperation with countries outside the Union. That can also entail a border opening. Migration policies often cut both ways – greater separation can be accompanied by new forms of proximity.[1] 

The purpose of this article is to look at the situation more closely. It begins with a brief presentation of the core ideas underlying the Schengen Area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). I then turn to the Central Mediterranean and show that even before 2015 the application of the Schengen and CEAS principles left much to be desired. A lack of uniform enforcement by the Italian authorities was the main problem. At sea the situation was difficult as well. The stationing of EU ships in the Sicilian Channel did not stem the flow of migrants. On the contrary, the numbers increased continuously. Given the political chaos in Libya after 2011, there was no functioning authority to cooperate with. The EU acted alone and the results are unsatisfactory.   

Things became more dramatic when the Aegean onrush began in August 2015. In the absence of EU solidarity, existing rules were once more poorly enforced, and new ones proved difficult to create. As compensation, the need to cooperate with countries outside the Union became evident. That was possible, because in contrast to Libya, Turkey has a functioning administration. The arrangement changed relations with Turkey, but because it was strictly bilateral, it did not impact Euro-Mediterranean relations as a whole. The avoidance of multilateral solutions by actors on both sides of the Mediterranean meant that existing regional organizations – unfortunately – were neither used nor strengthened.  

EU Border Policies

The goal of the Schengen concept is to allow EU citizens to move freely across the Union. Implied is the abolition of internal border controls and their substitution by external controls or, more precisely, by the creation of an external border with an integrated and partially supranational character. For the crossing of the outer border a number of rules were introduced. Europeans have to show valid travel documents, and the same applies to visa-free non-Europeans. Many non-Europeans, however, need SchTengen visas. These are issued by the member states and tied to certain requirements. 

Migrants and refugees are subject to the Dublin regulation. Among other things, the rule says that the country of first entry is responsible for registration and for handling asylum applications. If asylum is rejected, the same country is also responsible for returns. Secondary movements within the EU are to be avoided. It follows that the migration burden rests largely with the country of first entry. This is the reason why the Dublin regulation is often characterized as a single-filter system. 

Frontex is the EU agency mandated to assist member states in the management of the common external border. Although the institution has some supranational authority, its operational powers are limited. Maritime missions are an example. Frontex has practically no manpower or vessels of its own. For both it must rely heavily on national contributions. Its main duty is coordination.[2] 

The EU’s asylum policy, too, suffers from various weaknesses. CEAS is no more than a set of five principles (three directives and two regulations) meant to guide states in matters of asylum. Most are identical with those underlying the 1951 UNHCR convention.[3] However, the implementation of directives and regulations by EU states differs considerably. To better apply the rules the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was set up a few years ago, with headquarters in Malta. But, as the name implies, its purpose, too, is primarily to support national efforts.[4] 

At airports the arrangement has generally functioned. Although arrival controls are national, the concern with flight security has led states to strictly enforce the rules. Schengen visa regulations are mostly followed, and the identification of migrants and refugees is likely. It is true that some problems exist. Schengen overstayers are numerous, and forged documents are used by some. But, on the whole, the system’s performance explains why large migration movements are not by air. This is not self-evident, because in most cases, air tickets are significantly cheaper than the fees demanded by maritime migrant smugglers. 

Still, terrorist attacks in France and Belgium led in two areas to a tightening of EU borders. All passengers (including EU citizens) entering the Schengen Area must now have valid passports. Furthermore, on April 14 of this year the EU Parliament approved a directive permitting the collection and use of airline passenger data. Since both measures affect EU and non-EU citizens alike, travelers from Mediterranean countries are not subject to special discrimination. There is no specific neighborhood effect.   

The situation at the EU’s maritime borders is very different. Here the Schengen system has never functioned properly. A first reason for this, as I will show, is that sea borders raise practical control problems that land borders do not know.[5] A second reason is that some of the Schengen rules are inadequate and need amending, mainly the Dublin first country principle which puts a disproportionate burden on peripheral states like Italy and Greece. But a third and often major reason is that many existing rules are inadequately applied. Border tightening, therefore, has much to do with improved enforcement. Given these difficulties the system failed under ordinary conditions, and it nearly collapsed under the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the second half of 2015. The weaknesses are showing most glaringly along the blue borders of the Mediterranean, at sea and on land. 

Maritime Border Dilemma 

For years the Central Mediterranean was the main maritime migration route to Europe. Thousands of boat people crossed the Sicilian Channel, and Italy was their first country of arrival. The large majority were sub-Saharan Africans using Libya as a transit country.[6] The chaos prevailing after Gaddafi’s fall made it particularly easy for migrant smugglers to operate. The sea passage to Europe can be very dangerous, however. Although the Italian Coast Guard, assisted by the Guardia di Finanza and the Italian Navy, ran regular rescue operations, there were many accidents and numerous victims. 

A particularly tragic accident with nearly 400 victims happened in October 2013 off Lampedusa. As a consequence the Italian government decided to put the navy in charge and to create an operation called ‘Mare Nostrum’. Its core consisted of amphibious war ships capable of rescuing large numbers of migrants. The operation functioned throughout all of 2014, but the financial burden was heavy. Italy decided to request EU help, which was forthcoming. Beginning in November 2014, Frontex stepped in and organized Operation ‘Triton’.[7] Ships from various Schengen countries began to cruise close to Libyan territorial waters, picking up an ever larger number of migrants. Italian arrivals increased fourfold within a year, from 40,000 in 2013 to 170,000 in 2014.[8]  

Although the number of victims grew as well, both Mare Nostrum and Triton were increasingly seen as humanitarian ventures, as massive search-and-rescue (SAR) operations.[9] It was certainly how migrants and migrant smugglers perceived them. For both groups the presence of a sizeable fleet ready to intercept migrant boats was inviting and became a pull factor. Small wonder that the number of crossings increased.   

The influence on internal Libyan politics may have been negative as well. It is entirely possible that the growth in human trafficking, by strengthening the position of smugglers, hindered efforts to unite and pacify the various Libyan factions. Frustrating the business of migrant smugglers, by contrast, could serve both Libya and the EU. That is why in October 2015 the EU created Operation ‘Sophia’. Running under the umbrella of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) the main purpose is to fight migrant smuggling. The mission’s mandate was widened in June 2016 but is still limited to operations outside territorial waters. The results – as arrival figures indicate – are disappointing.[10]    

It goes to show that, seen as a whole, the impact of EU efforts in the Central Mediterranean was ambivalent, if not counterproductive. Initiatives meant to tighten the EU’s external sea borders had either no effect or, worse, ended up by opening them. The dynamics unleashed became self-defeating. Not that this led to a general worsening of the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean neighbors, but at least at sea, it demonstrated the Union’s impotence in matters of border management. 

Compensating on Land? 

Given the mixed EU results at sea, it would be logical to compensate on land. However, that was not simple either, because Italy’s application of the Dublin regulation was anything but systematic and effective. More arrivals were bound to make things worse. Disembarkation was usually unproblematic; the difficulties began after. The Dublin first country rule demands systematic registration, fingerprinting, and the possibility of filing asylum applications. For the procedures to function, migrants have to remain under governmental control and stay in one place. That happened only in part. Thousands managed to leave the reception facilities without going through proper procedures. Rules were not enforced, and neither EASO nor Frontex were in a position to help at that time. 

The failure had a number of causes. The division of labor among national but also among international agencies was often unclear. Some simply failed to do their jobs. There were numerous loopholes, and migrants learned how to take advantage of them. Economics also played a role. Italian farmers, especially in southern Italy, are ready to hire cheap irregular labor, and migrants are eager to work. Another factor is that Italy, a country with 60 million inhabitants and many humanitarian organizations, can more easily absorb irregulars than smaller states are able to. 

It is also true that Italy, like all peripheral EU members, perceived the Dublin regulation as unfair and was not unhappy to see migrants end up in other Schengen states. Francophone Africans tended to head for France or Belgium, Anglophone Africans for the UK. Others crossed into Switzerland, Austria, Germany, or Sweden. Not having been registered, migrants could not easily be returned to Italy, and with some luck, they were able to apply for asylum in the country of their choice. Secondary movements, also known as asylum shopping, became frequent. An informal relocation process was at work. The Dublin single filter idea was paralleled by an all-European multi-filter system. 

Although the number of Italian arrivals increased in 2014 and 2015, the situation was not overly dramatic. It was clear, however, that at some point the Schengen system needed proper enforcement or, as an alternative, that the Dublin first country rule had to be redefined. That proved to be difficult. It was easier, the EU discovered, to organize a fleet at sea than to tighten borders on land. 

The impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations was once again mixed. Since most migrants arriving were sub-Saharan Africans, Italy’s flawed performance did not directly impact its neighbors. It is true that some North Africans were among the arrivals, but this did not influence, let alone worsen, relations between the EU and the region as a whole. However, the limits of the EU’s land and sea capacities to manage its external borders were here for all to see. As far as the EU’s common foreign policy was concerned, that was not exactly a favorable development.  

Rebuilding National Borders 

During the first half of 2015, the Central Mediterranean was still the dominant migration route. That changed in August, when the dynamics shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean. The region had always witnessed a certain flow of migrants, but as far as the EU was concerned, it was of secondary importance. That was no longer so during the second part of 2015. The number of arrivals jumped to 107,000 in August, climbed to 212,000 in October, and even in December reached 109,000. All told, 856,000 boat people made it to Greece in 2015; in Italy it was a mere 154,000. The massive flow to Greece continued in early 2016. After 125,000 arrivals in January and February the seven month total was roughly one million.[11] 

If Italian border management was unsatisfactory, the situation in Greece was clearly worse. The country was simply overrun. The Schengen external border remained wide open, at sea and on land. The rules were hardly applied at all. The border needed fixing in the Aegean and on the mainland, but that was easier said than done. 

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean differs in numerous respects from that of the Central Mediterranean. Syria, one of the neighboring states, has been involved for five years in a brutal civil war among untold religious and civil factions, producing millions of refugees. Half of them have lived in Lebanon and Jordan for years; the other half went to Turkey, a country at war with its Kurd minority. The EU’s eastern neighborhood is fragmented and unstable. If you add Israel and Palestine, the picture is even worse. 

Maritime geography differs, too. In the Aegean numerous Greek islands are within sight of the Turkish coast, making crossings relatively short and much less dangerous than in the Central Mediterranean. Most boat people land unhindered on the shores of Greek islands. The coast guards of both Turkey and Greece are present, but given the short trips, their role is much less important than between Libya and Italy. There is no need to mount operations on the scale of Mare Nostrum and Triton. 

In the Aegean the business of migrant smugglers is therefore not influenced by the presence of large rescue fleets. If smuggling functions and the maritime door to Schengen remains open, it is primarily a consequence of calculated Turkish inaction. There is no failed state in the Aegean comparable to Libya. 

What aggravated the situation further was the fact that relations between Greece and Turkey have traditionally been cool. Although both are NATO members, several issues remain unsettled. Some maritime borders in the Aegean are in dispute, and the Cyprus issue is unsolved, to mention only two. Cooperation is the exception rather than the rule. 

On land the door was open, too. The reception of refugees and migrants in Greece has always been subject to criticism, and it got worse. What helped was that most migrants, like those arriving in Italy, did not intend to stay. They wanted to leave Greece as quickly as possible and head for Central and Northern Europe. That proved to be difficult. Greece has no common borders with Schengen states. To get to Germany, migrants have to cross several non-EU Balkan countries; this makes for a long, poorly coordinated, and often inhumane trip. Eventually, and egged on by Austria, the Balkan states affected decided to close their borders. Migrants were then stranded at the Greece-Macedonia border.   

Given the massive numbers arriving in Germany, Angela Merkel’s government occupied center stage. At home Merkel practiced something like an Open Door policy and expected EU cooperation. Her famous ‘we can handle this’ presupposed a combination of national and supranational action. That was not what happened. Narrow national interest prevailed in many Schengen countries. Hungary built a fence to block migrants from entering via Serbia and even extended it to neighboring Croatia, an EU member. Austria, too, followed a purely national course. It introduced border controls and added a numerical ceiling on asylum applications. Bavaria tended in the same direction, hurting Merkel in her own party and in the country as a whole. The pressures were immense. In September Germany herself had to request EU permission to temporarily control its borders. Although possible under the Schengen Code and approved by the Commission, the result was anything but ideal. The idea of a borderless Schengen Area suffered a major blow.[12] 

It was also a blow to Syrian refugees fleeing, after all, from a country in the EU’s Mediterranean neighborhood. Thousands were stopped at the national borders of EU members like Hungary and Austria and, as a consequence, of non-EU states like Serbia and Macedonia. Ironically, and as few would have expected, it was the rebuilding of borders within the Union that affected the Mediterranean neighborhood. But, once more, the impact was not on the area as a whole. As said, a truly regional approach was missing. 

EU Border Agenda 

The pressure on the Berlin government was immense. Angela Merkel had to take some hard decisions, and her best ally was Jean-Claude Juncker. As early as May 2015, the Commission formulated a ‘European Agenda on Migration’. At first it was of a relatively general nature but when the situation worsened it grew more concrete.[13]  Two points meant to alleviate the situation in Greece and Italy became central – the creation of ‘hotspot’ reception centers and the establishment of an EU-wide relocation mechanism for migrants bound to get asylum. The two issues are intimately interrelated: There can be no relocation without functioning reception centers, and, vice-versa, reception centers cannot function without relocation. 

Later on the Commission proposed two more projects. The first aimed at strengthening CEAS implementation by upgrading EASO. A report by some MEPs even suggested outright centralization of asylum procedures.[14] A second proposal submitted in December aimed at converting Frontex into a full-fledged European Border and Coast Guard.[15] A modest step in this direction had been taken when a Frontex mission named ‘Poseidon,’ for years active in the Aegean, was upgraded to become ‘Poseidon Rapid Intervention.’ More important was a decision taken in March of 2016 to cooperate with NATO. Its units were able to operate in Turkish waters. Frontex vessels could not.[16] 

The Commission approach contained supranational elements and was meant to strengthen the Union. Purely national solutions, so the prevailing opinion in Brussels and Berlin, would not work. Primary responsibility lay with the EU. The idea of outsourcing border management to neighboring countries was initially not one of the priorities. 

As said, implementation proved to be difficult. There was an embarrassing lack of solidarity, and where action was forthcoming, it proved to be late and slow. NATO cooperation was an exception. The first ship headed for the Aegean within 24 hours after the decision was announced. But that says nothing about effectiveness. The joint operation’s mandate was limited to observation and did not include interception or returns. Neither was the focus on fighting migrant smugglers. The contribution was modest. The hotspots, too, got a slow start. They were barely functional when needed most, and to this day, relocation has hardly got off the ground. 

All told, the EU strategy to tighten the outer Schengen borders existed on paper but not in reality, and the failure went hand in hand with the rebuilding of national borders. National unilateralism triumphed. And it was exactly this failure that made the help of neighbors so important. The Germans, because they were abandoned by their European partners, saw the need for a Mediterranean partner most clearly. In the Aegean theatre the obvious choice was Turkey.  

Closing and Opening Borders with Turkey 

The EU-Turkey arrangement had a number of dimensions. For the Merkel government, stopping the migrant smugglers was a top priority. As mentioned, the Greek Coast Guard plus Frontex and NATO were unable to do it. But Turkey, with a functioning governmental machinery, had the necessary capacities. That would take the pressure off Greece and ultimately reduce the flow of migrants into Germany. To further alleviate the burden on Greece the Turks agreed to a migrant/refugee swap: Migrants without a chance for asylum would be returned, and for each person taken back, the EU would resettle Syrians (with UNHCR assistance) from Turkish camps. Since those returned would be non-Syrians, the arrangement might deter migrants from outside the Syrian-Iraq war zone.[17] 

As a consequence not all Mediterranean nationals were treated alike. For migrants from states like Algeria or Morocco the doors were shut while for Syrians they were opened. Some Syrians were already in Greece waiting for an asylum decision; others might profit from the return/resettlement swap. But the door was also opened for Turks, potentially at least. Visa-free entry into the Schengen Area, on the EU-Turkey agenda for years, became an important negotiating topic. European borders, it follows, were closed for some and opened for others.  

Not everyone was happy. The arrangement was criticized as one-sided and morally questionable. Turkey was seen to profit more than the EU, and basic human rights were not fully respected. Critics argued that Turkey was not a safe third country and that the return agreement was therefore problematic. Even before the attempted military coup of June 15 many felt that the deal ignored Erdogan’s questionable fight against Kurds, parliamentarians, journalists, and academics. The massive arrests following the failed coup made things even worse. Co-opting neighbors to manage the external borders of Schengen had its price.   

Whatever the pros and cons, arrival numbers dropped after 20 March 2016, when the deal entered into force. In the first three months 150,000 boat people had arrived; in April the number was down to 3,650. In May a mere 1,465 crossed the Aegean, and there were no victims at all. Maritime outsourcing seemed to work. On the Greek islands the situation became less dramatic.[18]   

It was on the Continent that the pressure was now felt. Because the Balkan route was closed, 54,000 migrants were stranded in Greece. In earlier days there would have been ways to circumvent the Dublin regulation, but that changed. The migrants were put in camps and had to follow proper registration procedures. Since most of them were Syrians, they tended to apply for asylum. Some of the Schengen rules were finally enforced. Relocation was meant to follow but, as we know, is still not functioning as planned. 

The impact of the Union’s deal with Turkey on Euro-Mediterranean relations was here for all to see: To control its maritime borders, the EU needed the help of neighbors. It also showed that some were willing to cooperate, although after hard bargaining and at a considerable price. As a result the Schengen external borders were both closed and opened. Some Balkan neighbors were also ready to help. They did so by closing their borders, but the action was unilateral and without a negotiated arrangement. The EU and Germany, although not happy at first with this neighborly assistance, profited in the end. 

Tightening the Libyan Border? 

We have seen that in the Central Mediterranean the EU’s maritime strategy was anything but successful. Operation Triton is a massive SAR venture that ‒ unwillingly ‒ entails an opening rather than a tightening of borders. Operation Sophia, primarily meant to combat migrant smuggling, has failed to reach its goal as well. The smugglers are as active as ever. At heart the difficulties are political. Libya is a failed state. A central government with a functioning administration, including an effective police force and a competent coast guard, has yet to be rebuilt. In the absence of a new government any EU effort at border management is bound to be problematic or, worse, ineffective. 

The United Nations has tried to help with the formation of a unified government. On 17 December of last year, after long and difficult negotiations, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) managed to set up a Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.[19] Four months later, at the end of March 2016, Sarraj and his cabinet arrived in Tripoli by sea, took over some public buildings, and started efforts to reconcile the various factions. Whether they will succeed is yet uncertain. 

But let us assume that the GNA becomes the dominant force and is at some point ready to deal with the EU. The Italian and German Ministers of the Interior, Alfano and de Maizière, have announced that in such a case they would like to see a Turkey-like agreement.[20] That, they expect, would terminate migrant smuggling and could be combined with some sort of return/resettlement deal.[21] 

The plans of Alfano and de Maizière face various obstacles. As mentioned above, the new government would have to possess the necessary administrative tools. After five years of civil war, that will take some time. It is also conceivable that close EU cooperation might be opposed by some political groups and could weaken the GNA. It is no surprise, therefore, that Sarraj’s reaction was negative. The new Libyan government, he stated, would not agree to such a deal. The externalization ideas of the two EU ministers are premature, to say the least.

Another plan mentioned by de Maizière is to organize large ‘off-shore’ reception camps, either in the Maghreb or the Sahel region. The camps, similar to those housing Syrian refugees in the Levant, would be run by the UNHCR. But that idea, too, is not very realistic. No self-respecting African state is willing to play doorkeeper for Europe. The UNHCR, too, opposed the plan immediately.[22] 

The ‘Australian model’ is another form of outsourcing favored by some. The idea is popular in nationalist circles. Frauke Petry, the leader of Germany’s AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) is one of its proponents.[23] But she is not alone. Even Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz sees it as a possible solution.[24] After all, if Australia manages to isolate boat people on foreign islands, why should the EU not do the same? 

The problems are multiple. The critique is massive, even in Papua New Guinea (PNG) to which one of the islands belongs. A local court has ruled that the arrangement is intolerable. As a result Australia has come under pressure to close its PNG camp.[25] The situation in Europe is even less favorable. It is inconceivable that a Euro-Mediterranean neighbor like Tunisia would agree, for instance, to run a camp on one of the Kerkennah islands. The choice of EU islands is equally unlikely. It is pure phantasy to believe that the governments of Italy, Greece, or Malta would be ready to run internment camps on Pantelleria, Milos, or Gozo. 

If islands are out of the question, why not use ships? The concept, also referred to as 'floating hotspots', has its main supporters in the Italian government. On a visit to Catania Interior Minister Angelo Alfano mentioned the idea to EU Commissioner for Migration Avramopoulos. According to Alfano such hotspots would handle registration and fingerprinting, an idea that Avramopoulos considered interesting and worth studying.[26] The proposal is not entirely unrealistic; it might function on large Triton ships. But it would hardly work on smaller vessels used by the Italian Coast Guard, the Guardia di Finanza and the various NGOs. And it could most certainly not be implemented on merchant ships.   

There are humanitarian objections as well. The Italian Bishops Conference fears that such ships might turn into floating detention centers with no proper handling of asylum applications.[27] Human rights groups also warn that the scheme might be tied to collective returns. The fear is not unreasonable because such measures, also known as ‘push-backs’, are part of both the Australian Model and the Austrian Foreign Minister’s plans. Italy practiced push-backs same some years ago based on a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ signed in 2008 between Prime Minister Berlusconi and Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi. The Italian navy, at that time, returned intercepted migrants directly and collectively to Libya. The practice ended in 2012 when the European Court of Human Rights declared push-backs as illegal.[28] It is unlikely that any government of the Euro-Mediterranean region would again cooperate in a push-back scheme. 

Given the various difficulties associated with outsourcing, more direct and aggressive forms of action are demanded by some. Migrant smugglers, so one idea, have to be stopped with military means by widening the mandate of operation Sophia.[29] EU naval units should be allowed to enter Libyan territorial waters, to cruise along the Libyan coast and, if necessary, to operate on land. That, of course, raises questions as well. Interventions of this type violate Libyan sovereignty, and neighboring states, the Arab League or the Organization of African Unity, might protest. Efforts to legitimize the effort by obtaining UN support would most certainly fail. 

Some experts suggest the use of clandestine means, of operating with the help of special forces already on the ground.[30] Sent by some Western countries to assist local militias in their fight against IS terrorists, these units could, at some point, be used to stop the migrant smugglers.[31] The strategy might work should IS become a serious threat to Libya and its neighbors. It might then, as in Syria and Iraq, even be supported by other Arab states. For the moment that is not the case. It is also possible that an intervention of that kind might run into difficulties with local strongmen like General Hafter. European forces would then become embroiled in internal squabbles and fight on several fronts. The price for the elimination of migrant smuggling might be very high. 

The conclusions are sobering – both outsourcing and direct military action confront serious difficulties and are unlikely to succeed. Many would have a clearly negative impact on neighborhood relations. It is thus fair to assume that for the near future the unsatisfactory situation at Schengen’s southern sea border will persist. To keep the problem within limits it is advisable, as said, to compensate on land by finally tightening the Italian border. It is true that during the summer of this year some improvements have occurred, but much remains to be done. Hotspots have to become more efficient, existing rules have to be enforced, and relocations and returns have to function. 

The instruments to better manage returns exist. For some years already the EU has pursued what it calls a Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). As part of the policy it promotes Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security that can entail Mobility Partnerships with individual countries. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, the programs are part of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, also known as EUROMED.[32] Actual Mobility Partnerships have been concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. Frontex, to organize Joint Return Operations, has entered into similar agreements with states inside and outside the Mediterranean region.[33] 

Individual Schengen countries are doing the same. Switzerland, for instance, has signed what it calls a Migration Partnership Agreement with Tunisia.[34] As part of the deal Tunisia was willing to take back several thousand nationals that crossed the Sicilian Channel in early 2011 when the government, during the revolution, was unable to control its borders. Similar readmission agreements, as Lisa Watanabe shows, have become rather common.[35] Although critics see the various deals as one-sided, the result is often a combination of border closing and border opening.  

Conclusions

What then, seen as a whole, was the impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations of the various EU efforts? The answer, as usual, is somewhat complicated. Only one thing is crystal clear – the impact was neither regional nor multilateral. But it could have been. In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was founded in Barcelona. It was upgraded in 2008 to become the Euro-Mediterranean Union (EMU). The purpose of both forums, as their names suggest, is to bring the two sides of the Mediterranean closer together and to look for regional solutions. The arrangement, also known as the Barcelona Process, is meant to transcend unilateral or bilateral politics and to put relations between the EU and its southern neighbors on a multilateral footing.[36] 

The EU has made no use of this possibility, it avoided regional multilateralism. Instead its approach was bilateral or unilateral. The Libya actions are unilateral, the Turkey deal is bilateral, and the same is true for the various mobility partnerships. EU policies were not meant to have a uniform impact on the entire region – and they did not. There was no general closing or opening of Mediterranean borders. The focus was on specific problems, countries and solutions. The overall result, therefore, is rather traditional. Diversity triumphs over unity.   

As said, things could have been different. As part of the Barcelona Process there were discussions on a possible Charter of Security. Many ideas were floated. Malta’s Stephen C. Calleya, an academic specialized in Mediterranean relations, proposed the creation of a Mediterranean early warning mechanism accompanied by a Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA). To manage the present migration problems multilaterally both could have been useful with the effect of promoting Euro-Mediterranean relations. But the Charter was never written.[37] 

The idea has not entirely died. The EU Commission’s proposal for the creation of European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) opens the door for cooperation of this kind. The new agency, among other things, is meant to coordinate border operations between member states but is also empowered “to launch joint operations with neighboring third countries”.[38] That would make it possible to organize multilateral border control operations with Mediterranean neighbors. A step in this direction is the joint effort of Greek, Turkish, and NATO vessels in the Aegean. Few details are known about the mission, but within certain limits, the experiment seems to function.   

The lack of enthusiasm in Brussels for regional solutions is not entirely surprising. The Barcelona Process has gone on for years with disappointing results. The political landscape of the Mediterranean is highly heterogeneous, state interests vary enormously, and conflicts are frequent. Even sub-regional solutions are difficult to obtain.[39] It is unlikely, for instance, that Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt would agree to joint coast guard operations, although the necessary capabilities are available. 

But problems exist on the EU side as well. Even if Brussels had tried to organize a regional effort, some members might have blocked the idea. As we have seen, unilateralism has also spread inside the Union. It shows when states like Hungary build border fences, when the Austrians impose a numerical ceiling on asylum applications, or when relocation is opposed by the Visegrad states. For joint Euro-Mediterranean action, both sides of the sea must be ready to cooperate. It takes two to Tango! In 2015 and 2016 this was impossible. 

This is not to say that the EU could (and should) not have done more on its own. For five years the Syrian war has produced millions of refugees. It would have been entirely possible during this period to run, with the help of the UNHCR, a generous resettlement program relieving the pressure on Lebanese, Jordanian, and Turkish camps. The gradual and well-organized arrival of Syrians at airports and in harbors would have alerted European public opinion to the plight of people in their not too distant neighborhood. The impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations could have been positive. The action might possibly have helped to prevent an uncontrolled exodus. As NGOs and EU parliamentarians have demanded for years, Europe should have opened legal channels for regular migration long ago. The idea is now contained in the EU’s Migration Agenda, but it comes late and does not enjoy a high enough priority. 

***** 

[1] For a study dealing specifically with the EU’s outsourcing (or externalizing) of border problems to Mediterranean neighbors, see Lisa Watanabe, “Borderline Practices – Irregular Migration and EU External Relations,” in Oliver Thränert and Martin Zapfe, Strategic Trends 2016, Key Developments in Global Affairs, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich 2016, pp. 29-45; for a general study on Euro-Mediterranean relations, see Stephen C. Calleya, Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations, Routledge, London and New York 2005; for a recent publication on Mediterranean migration see Omar Grech and Monika Wohlfeld (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean: Human Rights, Security and Development Perspectives, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), University of Malta, Msida 2014. 

[2] See http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/

[3] See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

[4] Robert K. Visser, “The Dynamics of Migration: The Role of the European Asylum Support Office,” in Grech and Wohlfeld, Migration in the Mediterranean, op. cit., pp. 15-23.

[5] For a general discussion of the issue see Joe Borg, “Maritime Governance,” in Mediterranean Perspectives on International Relations, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), University of Malta, Msida 2009, pp. 135-142.

[6] Derek Lutterbeck, “The Challenge of Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean,” in Mediterranean Perspectives, op. cit., pp. 61-83.

[7] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Triton

[8] Malta profited from the presence of Mare Nostrum and Triton. Given its huge SAR zone inherited from the British, Malta’s Coast Guard was up to 2013 regularly involved in SAR operations and the country ended up with the highest per capita proportion of asylum seekers in the EU. That changed with the presence of military vessels. To this day, they take migrants directly to Italian ports.

[9] The impression was reinforced by the presence of an increasing number of non-governmental SAR vessels. By the summer of 2016 ships of six different groups were active: MOAS (Italian), Médecins sans Frontières (international), SOS Méditerranée, Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye and Jugend Rettet (all German).

[10] See http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf

[11] See my website www.blue-borders.ch 

[12] For the Commission’s reaction see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5638_en.htm?locale=en; see also http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5900_en.htm?locale=en. On 12 May 2016 the EU Commission extended the permission for another six months, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1723_en.htm

[13] For the original version of 13 May 2015 see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

[14] See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160315IPR19462/MEPs-propose-a-centralised-EU-system-for-asylum-claims-with-national-quotas

[15] See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm?locale=en. For a critical analysis of the proposal see Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog, “A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a name?,” CEPS Paper No. 88, Brussels March 2016.

[16] See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0EB6E7D7-6CC6CB39/natolive/news_128833.htm?selectedLocale=en&mode=pressrelease 

[17] For the EU Council’s announcement of the EU-Turkey agreement on 18 March 2016 see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/

[18] See www.blue-borders.ch

[19] For UNSMIL chief Kobler’s statement see http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099402&language=en-US

[20] The announcement was reported by ANSAmed on 21 April 2016; see http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2016/04/21/eu-turkey-deal-should-be-repeated-with-libya-alfano_0db10045-549a-4bbe-b864-3d12ac3883b1.html

[21] Alfano reiterated the idea on 22 August 2016; see http://www.lapresse.it/migranti-alfano-accordo-con-turchia-andrebbe-replicato-in-libia.html 

[22] Spiegel 30.12.2014; see http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-bamf-chef-schmidt-fuer-aufnahmezentren-in-nordafrika-a-1010727.html

[23] BBC 13.8.2016; see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37072726

[24] Die Welt 5.6.2016; see http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article155967547/Oesterreich-will-Fluechtlinge-im-Mittelmeer-abfangen.html       

[25] See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-asylum-idUSKCN10S0QL

[26] See http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/catania/cronaca/16_aprile_27/migranti-proposta-alfano-realizzare-hotspot-mare-e0d33f0a-0c90-11e6-bf5b-962968293f6d.shtml

[27] See http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2016/06/01/ceis-galantino-blasts-idea-of-floating-hotspots-at-sea_4527bd27-b49b-480f-ab4b-aa5ac6be603d.html

[28] For the ECtHR judgement in the case of ‘Hirsi vs. Italy’ see http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"dmdocnumber":["901565"],"itemid":["001-109231"]}

[29] A modest step in this direction was possibly taken when the EU Council on 23 May 2016 decided that the Sophia mandate should include the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and the enforcing of the UN arms embargo. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/23-fac-eunavfor-sophia/. For a more detailed discussion of the Libyan situation see Lisa Watanabe, “Libya – in the Eye of the Storm”, in CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 193, June 2016, Center for Security Studies (CSS), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich.

[30] The United States have in the meantime admitted their involvement which, for months, was denied. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36941934

[31] For a discussion of migration from a security angle see Stephen C. Calleya, Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area in the 21st Century, Routledge, Abingdon UK 2013, pp. 85-95; Monika Wohlfeld, “Is Migration a Security Issue”? in Grech and Wohlfeld, Migration and the Mediterranean, op. cit., pp. 61-77.

[32] See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/mobility-partnerships-visa-facilitation-and-readmission-agreements/index_en.htm

[33] See http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/return/

[34] See https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/internationales/internat-zusarbeit/bilateral/migrationspartnerschaften.html

[35] Watanabe, Borderline Practices, op. cit., p. 39-40.

[36] Stephen C. Calleya, “From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union of the Mediterranean”, in Mediterranean Perspectives, op. cit., pp. 15-34; Stephen C. Calleya, “A Strategic Reassessment of EU Policy in the Mediterranean,” in Stephen C. Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld, Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), University of Malta, Msida 2012, pp. 413-430.      

[37] Stephen C. Calleya, Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations, op. cit., pp. 67-72; Stephen C. Calleya, Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

[38] See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf

[39] Steven C. Calleya, Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations, op. cit., pp. 9-60, 127-132.