SUMMARY
In 2014, the migratory constellation typical of the Central Mediterranean changed in important ways. First and foremost, the number of crossings jumped from nearly 40’000 in 2013 to about 170’000. The number of victims (dead and missing) grew as well, climbing from approximately 800 to around 2’200. Operation Mare Nostrum represented another major change. Organized by Italy, Mare Nostrum started last October and was followed in November of this year by the FRONTEX operation Triton. Triton is a modest undertaking forcing Italy, once again, to shoulder the main burden. The exact division of labor remains uncertain, but as practice has shown, on-scene cooperation seems to work. Italy also continues to be responsible for the processing of migrants upon arrival. There is no new EU policy in this respect.
Another major factor was the deteriorating situation in Libya. What began as a relatively short uprising against Gaddafi has turned into a prolonged and nasty civil war. With the disintegration of governmental institutions and a total lack of security, Libya has become an important transit country for migrants. Whether this will continue to be the case in 2015 remains uncertain. There are signs that Syrian refugees prefer to reach Italy via the Eastern Mediterranean.
ARRIVALS
GGraph 1 indicates the monthly pattern of arrivals. It shows the usual seasonal variation with a clear peak during the summer months. Given the presence of Mare Nostrum, winter arrivals were at an all-time high. Also, migrants frequently arrived in large waves. The reasons are meteorological but may also reflect organizational considerations by migrant smugglers. Graph 2 shows arrivals in relative terms, by comparing the years 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Mare Nostrum changed the pattern of arrivals. The reason is that the big navy ships at the heart of the operation ‘collected’ migrants from various smaller boats and then took large groups to harbors in Southern Italy. The main ports of arrival are in Sicily, but migrants are also taken to Calabria, Apulia, and even to Campania. Lampedusa and Malta are largely avoided.
ARRIVAL FIGURES
The impact of Mare Nostrum on information quality is mixed. On the negative side, there were fewer (or less reliable) reports on individual rescues, especially by the Guardia Costiera, the Guardia di Finanza, and by merchant ships. But on the positive side, there were regular accounts of large-scale disembarkations. What also helps is the presence of UNHCR representatives at arrivals. UNHCR numbers, as a result, are the best we have, and they are not much different from mine. UNHCR counts 170’000 arrivals; my figure is around 155’000. If we add the 9'351 arrivals in Campania harbors, which I missed, the two computations are very close. Also, UNHCR publishes its figures at regular intervals, something that cannot be said about the various agencies of the Italian government. It is also important to add that the figures published and used by the EU Commission, FRONTEX and Eurostat are supplied by member states and are largely identical with those gathered by UNHCR.
VICTIMS
The number of victims is also up. My count is 2’196 (including dead and missing), compared to 766 for 2013. Some accidents were large. Thirteen of them claimed 20 victims and more, and some were particularly grave. There was one with 128 victims (ANSA 30.7.), a second with 170 (BBC 23.8.), a third with 181 (BS 22.7.), and a fourth with 200 victims (BBC 15.9.). All of these accidents occurred along the Libyan coast, some very close to it. A particularly tragic incident with 500 victims happened between Crete and Italy (IOM 16.9.). In contrast to 2013, there were no major incidents along the Italian coast.
COUNTING VICTIMS
Figures about victims must be viewed with caution. Since most of the accidents happened along the long Libyan coast, the information obtained is often unreliable. Based on press and other publicly available reports I counted a total of 44 accidents with around 2’200 victims, as stated above. The figure is roughly confirmed by Gabriele Del Grande, who has collected casualty figures since 1994 (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.ch/). Up to 3 October 2014, when Del Grande’s list for some reason ends, he reports 2’039 Central Mediterranean dead. If 100 victims are added to cover the last three months of the year, we arrive at a total of 2’140. That figure is close to mine.
The UNHCR also publishes information about victims. On 10 December UNHCR reported 3’419 casualties for 2014 (ANSAmed 10.12.), 1’223 more than my count. The gap appears to be major, but perhaps it is not. The organization, when mentioning casualties, tends to speak about ‘the’ Mediterranean. Therefore, it could be that the figure for the Central Mediterranean is lower.
A website called The Migrants Files constitutes another effort to count casualties. It was started in August 2013 by a number of journalists working for major European newspapers. Their aim is to “accurately calculate and report the deaths of emigrants” (https://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files/event/). Unfortunately, in 2014 the journalists involved failed to accurately calculate and report. The list published mentions only 27 Central Mediterranean accidents with a total of 1’281 victims. That is simply too few.
Finally, there is WatchTheMed. The purpose of this website is two-fold. One goal is “to monitor the deaths and violations of migrant’s rights at the maritime borders of the EU”. Another objective is to function as a “participatory mapping platform” meant to provide instant information about “ongoing situations of distress”. The second purpose seems to dominate over the first. There is a list of Central Mediterranean accidents and victims, but it is neither systematic nor comprehensive (http://www.watchthemed.net/). Helping migrants in distress at sea appears to be the overriding goal.
ROUTES
There were practically no arrivals from Tunisia. The main reason is that after a short interruption in early 2011, state institutions continued to function. This is not to say that some Tunisians may not be involved in migrant smuggling, but few Tunisian nationals (known as 'harragas') depart by sea, and it is most certainly not an attractive transit country. In 2014 Tunisia embarked on a path of democratic state building, with a new constitution passed in January, a new parliament constituted in October (BBC 27.10.), and a new president elected in December (BBC 22.12.).
The situation in Libya is very different. The central government has disintegrated, and public institutions have practically ceased to function. As said, it is an important transit country. However, one wonders why Syrians fleeing from the brutalities of one civil war should choose to enter another civil war? There are initial signs that this may indeed be changing. During the last months of 2014, Syrians (but also Palestinians and Kurds) increasingly used the Eastern Mediterranean route to head for Italy. From September onward, there were at least 12 such voyages, usually departing from Turkey and often with the use of old freighters. Three cases, all in late December, were particularly large and dramatic. Around 1’800 refugees arrived within 10 days on what the press referred to as 'ghost ships' (ANSA 20.12., ANSA 22.12., BBC 31.12.).
MARE NOSTRUM
Operation Mare Nostrum was new; nothing of the sort had been attempted before. Normally, it is the Guardia Costiera and the Guardia di Finanza that are responsible for SAR (Search and Rescue). That changed. At the heart of the operation were large navy ships equipped with smaller landing vehicles meant (in amphibious operations) to take troops to foreign beaches. The reverse now happened: Migrants and refugees were ‘picked up’ and disembarked in Italy. Mare Nostrum covered the entire Central Mediterranean, right up to the Libyan coast.
The impact was considerable. Without this massive deployment of vessels it would have been impossible to handle over 160’000 migrants. Mare Nostrum, along with the presence of merchant ships, no doubt entered into the calculation of migrant smugglers operating in the area and, in that sense, constituted a ‘pull’ factor in the equation.
MERCHANT SHIPS
The Sicilian Channel is an extremely busy maritime route. The probability that migrant vessels are detected by merchant ships is fairly high. It also matters that the law of the sea requires shipmasters to rescues persons ‘in distress at sea’. The obligation is part of the SOLAS Convention (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) adopted in 1914. It is true that some captains, for economic reasons, prefer to ignore the obligation. Picking up migrants can be a costly undertaking.
Merchant ships were involved in at least 80 different instances. A total of about 20’000 migrants were taken on board, amounting to approximately 15% of all arrivals. In at least 20 cases merchant ships cooperated with units of the navy, the Guardia Costiera, and the Guardia di Finanza. Several of the efforts were large and complicated, involving from 600 to 1’600 migrants (BS 13.8., ANSA 17.11., ANSA 6.12.).
MOAS
In 2014, the Central Mediterranean saw a new and entirely private initiative. It goes by the name of MOAS, the ‘Migrant Offshore Aid Station’. Set up as a foundation registered in Malta, the project was initiated by an Italian-American couple. Its aim is to prevent the loss of life at sea by providing assistance to migrants in distress. To finance the first year the founders invested their own money. For the continuation of the effort they are in search of additional funds. The director of the project is Martin Xuereb, former Chief of the Armed Forces of Malta (http://www.moas.eu/).
MOAS is equipped with a 40-meter vessel, two Remote Piloted Aircraft, two RHIBs (rigid-hulled inflatable boats), and an experienced team of rescuers and paramedics. From 25 August to 30 October three operations were conducted, each with several phases. All started and ended in Malta. There was a total of 2’729 rescues, usually coordinated by the MRCC Rome and, in many instances, in cooperation with the Guardia Costiera, the Italian Navy, or with merchant ships.
EU PARLIAMENT
EU parliamentary elections were held between 22 and 25 May. Migration was not a major issue. It is true that both Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Juncker did mention the topic when campaigning in Italy and Malta (MT 10.5.). However, and as is typical of such campaigns, the references were of a very general nature. No truly new policies were suggested.
The EU Parliament was directly involved in the drafting of the new FRONTEX Code of Conduct. It contains a number of rules governing the surveillance of the EU’s external borders (LIBE 20.2., EUCL 20.2.). The inclusion of the principle of non-refoulement (or the prohibition of push-backs) is one of the major improvements. The code was worked out by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) in cooperation, as usual, with the Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Parliament as a whole approved of the new code in April (EUPL 16.4.).
EU COMMISSION
As a reaction to the October 2013 accident off Lampedusa, the EU Commission announced the formation of the Task Force Mediterranean. It produced a paper summarizing things that the EU was already doing. Additional Task Force publications appeared in May and June of this year (EUCOM 27.5., EUCL 5.6.). Once again, no truly new policies were suggested. In an interview given to the Wall Street Journal Cecilia Malmström summarized the Commission’s over-all position and reiterating well-known ideas (WSJ 26.6.). The same goes for the Commission’s sixth biannual report on the Schengen Area published toward the end of the year (EUCOM 27.11.).
After the parliamentary elections, in July and August, Italy's Minister of Interior Angelino Alfano began to really push for an EU operation to replace Mare Nostrum. A meeting between him and Cecilia Malmström took place in Milan (BS 9.7.). A first Commission proposal appeared in August (EUCOM 27.8.). The definitive decision to set up Triton followed in October (EUCOM 7.10.). Later in the month the Commission published some of the details governing the operation (EUCOM 31.10.). With the formation of the new Commission in September Cecilia Malmström became Commissioner for Trade. As the new Commissioner for Migration Jean-Claude Juncker appointed a Greek, Dimitris Avramopoulos (EUCOM 10.9.).
EU JHA COUNCIL
There were four JHA Council Meetings in 2014, in March, June, October, and December. During the second half of the year the meetings were chaired by Italy. Angelino Alfano used the opportunity to push actively for a replacement of Mare Nostrum. He did so as early as April (ANSA 9.4.) and also after the EU Parliament elections (ANSA 14.6., ANSA 16.6.). The EU Council approved Triton in October (EUCL 9.10.). No other major decisions regarding migration were taken during this period. The same goes for the EU Summit held in June (MT 27.6.).
TRITON
The new operation is of modest proportions. The main reason is that FRONTEX does not possess its own means. Its mandate is limited to promoting the cooperation of national efforts. Furthermore, the main emphasis is on security, more precisely on surveillance. Search and rescue (SAR) is part of Triton, but it is not dominant (EUCOM 31.10.). And, as the EU Commission emphasizes, Triton is not meant to replace Mare Nostrum. It is no more than a continuation of two earlier operations, Hermes and Aeneas (EUCOM 27.8.).
Triton is also limited in geographic terms; it is meant to patrol an area 30 NM off the Italian coast. The means available are limited as well. Five teams are assigned to help with debriefing, not to be confused with the registration required by the Schengen/Dublin agreements. The material assets are modest, too. There are plans for two open sea (offshore) patrol vessels, 4 coastal (inshore) patrol vessels, a fixed-wing airplane, and a helicopter.
Cecilia Malmström made it amply clear that Triton is no substitute for Mare Nostrum (ToM 9.7.). Unfortunately, the division of labor between Italy and FRONTEX has never been communicated (ANSAmed 17.10.). Not even Angelino Alfano seems to know the details (BS 22.10.). What further confuses the picture is that in November a Portuguese Triton ship rescued migrants near Libya – far off the 30 NM area it is meant to operate in (Expresso 20.11.). What we do know is that the main burden continues to rest on Italian shoulders. Fortunately, as recent events have shown, the on-scene cooperation between the two sides seems to work.
BEYOND DUBLIN
Although Italy has made great efforts at sea, and continues to do so, its performance on land is much less satisfactory. The administrative processing of migrants, in conformity with the Dublin Regulation, leaves much to be desired. Special efforts and solutions are necessary, but, as mentioned, the Commission has failed to submit truly new proposals. The same applies to the UNHCR. In its 'Central Mediterranean Sea Initiative', published in July, the problems and possible solutions are mentioned but only in a general way (UNHCR 22.7.). More concrete ideas have been forthcoming from the EU Economic and Social (Advisory) Committee. The body suggests a number of new steps in the areas of disembarkation and relocation. A more effective involvement of EASO, the European Asylum Support Office located in Malta, is mentioned as well (EESC 6.3.).
Relocation efforts are not entirely new. Some years ago, the EU started a pilot project, EUREMA, for intra-EU relocation of refugees granted asylum in Malta. The program has met with some success. Of the 6'045 boat people who arrived on the island since 2011 a total of 1'771 have been resettled (ToM 18.12.).
AFRICAN ‘RECEPTION CENTERS'?
Another idea cropping up now and then is the installation of ‘reception centers’ in North Africa. The proposal is not new. Back in 2004, German Minister of the Interior Otto Schily suggested the creation of such centers. This year, with the arrival of thousands of unregistered boat people in Germany, the idea surfaced again. German Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière mentioned the opening of ‘welcome centers’ in North Africa, possibly run by UNHCR (Pro Asyl 12.11., die Welt 15.11.). He was seconded by Manfred Schmidt, head of Germany’s Federal Office of Migration (Spiegel 30.12.). Italian Prime Minister Mateo Renzi, too, played with the idea (ANSAmed 20.5.), and so did the Greeks during their EU presidency (ToM 3.6.).
None of the proposals was ever discussed seriously – they are too unrealistic. Libya, as a failing state, is out of the question. Functioning states like Tunisia and Algeria are willing to control their borders, on land and at sea, but they are unwilling to become institutional ‘gate-keepers’ for Europe. There are good reasons why the idea did not appear in the final document of the 4th EU-Africa Summit, held 2-3 April 2014 (EUCL 3.4.). It simply has no chance.