The text has several parts
Part I - GENERAL COMMENTARY
LAMPEDUSA
85% of all Central Mediterranean migrants – or 38'000 of roughly 45'000 – end up in Lampedusa. The remaining southern coasts of Italy account for 11%, Malta for around 4%. Lampedusa is clearly the most important destination. For an attempt to explain this one-sided distribution, see the special pages on Problems and Solutions. On 23 September, the Italian government declared Lampedusa an "unsafe port" for landing.
ARRIVAL PATTERNS
For the year 2011, it is useful to distinguish three Lampedusa arrival patterns: (1) "isolated" arrivals of up to 300 persons during one or two days; (2) arrival "waves", ranging from 300 to 5'000 persons and lasting up to ten days; (3) arrival "cycles", covering several months.
"Isolated" Lampedusa arrivals are relatively rare. There are only a handful of examples: 76 Tunisians (3-4 Sept.), 121 Tunisians (30 Aug.), 200 Tunisians (19-21 Aug.), 231 Sub-Saharan Africans (17 July), 286 Sub-Saharan Africans (13 July). Most other arrivals, especially from February to June, were part of longer and more massive flows.
There were 24 "waves",15 of which included over 1'000 migrants. The largest rush lasted 11 days (18-28 March) and totaled 5'100 Tunisians, 2'000 of whom arrived in a single 24-hour period (27-28 March).
"Cycles" last for several months. There was a two-month Tunisian cycle stretching from early February to the beginning of April. It was followed by a five-month Libyan cycle (mainly Sub-Saharan Africans) that lasted from the middle of March through the middle of August. The two cycles coincide with domestic upheaval in Tunisia and Libya. A third and smaller cycle began mid-August and ended toward the end of September.
PORTS OF DEPARTURE
Publicly available sources do not name specific ports of departure. No pattern can be established. However, it is safe to assume that when Italian and Maltese authorities interview migrants, they are able to establish ports (and possibly circumstances) of departure. At least that is what FRONTEX reports seem to suggest.
NATIONALITIES
The chronology distinguishes between "Tunisians", "Sub-Saharan Africans" and "Others". For Lampedusa and the southern Italian ports the largest group consists of Sub-Saharan migrants (25'000) from West, East and Central Africa. It appears that many were laborers expelled by the Gaddafi regime. The second largest group is Tunisians (17'800). By far the smallest group is "Others" (2'700). When identified as "Asians" this group can include migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and other places to the "East". Given the fact that most migrants are undocumented (or "sans-papiers" and "irregulars"), determination of their nationality is often problematic.
ITALIAN/MALTESE COMPARISON
The population of Italy is 150 times larger than that of Malta (60 million vs. 400'000). If debarkations were proportional, the 1'500 arrivals for Malta would amount to 225'000 for Italy. The actual figure is around 45'000, five times less! Small wonder that the Maltese feel Italy should do more and, to alleviate their burden, demand the establishment of an EU refugee reloaction scheme. For a detailed discussion of the various Italian-Maltese debarkation incidents and of possible remedies see Problems and Solutions.
REPATRIATION
Under the agreement of 6 April with Tunisia, the Italian government repatriated the first migrants on 14 April. After the September closing of Lampedusa almost 1500 Tunisians were flown back (23.9.-7.10.). In Italy repatriation figures are (at times) publicized, in Tunisia they are not. More recently Italy has begun to repatriate Egyptians (25.10., 20.11.). Repatriation presupposes disembarkation, whereas "push backs", as practiced between Italy and Libya in 2009 and 2010, imply a direct return without disembarkation. 42 Afghans were "pushed back" to Greece (15.11.); 100 Tunisians were "pushed back" to the Tunisian Coast Guard (22.8.).
MIGRANT PROTESTS
There were half a dozen protests at Italian reception camps, and there was one at Malta. Some involved only a handful of people and were peaceful, but others were massive, as was the case when Tunisians practically burnt down the Lampedusa facilities in September. Tunisians tended to protest against repatriation (22-23 Sept., 29-30 Aug., 18 Aug.), whereas others complained about detention conditions or the slow process of status determination (16-17 Aug.).
Part II - ARRIVALS
LIMITATIONS
The data on which the chronology is based are all secondhand. They originate from the websites of newspapers, news agencies, governments, IOs and NGOs. Although most of the information appears to be reliable, there are certain limitations. Whereas Lampedusa and Malta landings are regularly covered by the media, those along the southern coasts of Italy are not. This information is bound to be incomplete. Also, a careful look at the figures reveals various discrepancies. Some differences are minor, but many are major. If some of my figures are perhaps too low, those reported by others are often too high.
MINOR DISCREPANCIES
There are only minor differences between the data published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and my own. By 17 October, according to IOM, 25'935 persons fled by sea from Libya to Italy. My count is 24'601. The figures about Malta arrivals are even closer. My 31 October total is 1'526, that of IOM and of the Times of Malta is 1'530, all of them from Libya. The official Maltese figures also appear in the FRONTEX 2nd Quarter (Q2) Report.
MAJOR DISCREPANCIES
More problematic are the figures reported by the Italian government. Two examples are typical. Interior Minister Maroni speaks of 44'000 arrivals at Lampedusa and southern Italy by early July; my figure is 36'500. On 28 September the Interior Ministry, at a parliamentary hearing, mentions 60'656 arrivals by sea for all of Italy and 51'596 for the Pelagic Islands (or Lampedusa). My figures are 43'570 for Italy and 38'185 for Lampedusa – a difference of almost 40%! ANSA reported these figures on 28 September 2011, and they were then taken over by numerous news media.
FRONTEX numbers are equally problematic. In its First Quarter (Q1) Report the EU body mentions 20'000 Lampedusa arrivals; my count is 14'100. The Q2 Report speaks of 25'500 sea arrivals for all of Italy; my count is 18'000. For the 3rd Quarter FRONTEX reports 12'000 Lampedusa arrivals whereas my count is 8'000 - a 50% difference. In its Annual Risk Analysis (published in April 2012) FRONTEX claims 64'000 "detections" in the Central Mediterranean; my figure is 47'000!
The figures cited by the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee investigating the situation at Lampedusa are also higher. PACE mentions 55'298 arrivals by 30 September, 4'000 more than the Italian government! My count is 38'185.
Many organizations, including the PACE Committee, ANSA and the press, use figures computed by UNHCR. La Repubblica, for instance, quotes the organization on 10 September with 54'000 Lampedusa arrivals (26'000 from Tunisia, 28'000 from Libya). My figure for that date is around 37'000 (16'000 from Tunisia, 21'000 from Libya). For the entire year 2011 UNHCR speaks regularly of 56'000 Central Mediterranean arrivals. My count, as said, is 47'000. These figures are not as far off as those mentioned by FRONTEX but still sizeable and difficult to explain - at least for an outsider. So far I have been unable to find out how UNHCR figures are computed.
The figures published by NGOs or blogs can be problematic as well. Fortress Europe, without indicating a definite source, claims that by the middle of August Italy saw 50'000 arrivals by sea, half of whom came from Tunisia, the other half from Libya! The quality of this information, too, is debatable.
Throughout 2011, no reliable information about irregular migration emanated from the Tunisian and Libyan governments. We do not know the details of the 6 April 2011 agreement between Tunisia and Italy, and there is no discussion at all of Tunisian repatriations, especially after the September closure of Lampedusa.
In Tunisia the situation only began to change when in December families of missing "harragas", supported by a human rights group, demanded governmental action. On 16 March 2012, the minister in charge of emigration, Houcine Jaziri, addressed the problem for a fist time publicly. By his count, over 30'000 (!) Tunisians left for Lampedusa after January 14.
Part III - VICTIMS
DATA QUALITY
The information about victims, too, is incomplete and suffers from discrepancies. Governments rarely report about victims, thereby eliminating an important source. It is mainly the media that broach the topic, which explains why the figures published by UNHCR, by Fortress Europe and by myself are largely media-based. But discrepancies are common.
TERMINOLOGY
The terminology used can add to uncertainty. Some reports mention "victims" or "casualties" without specifying what the terms mean. More precise reports distinguish between missing and dead. Figures about dead (or fatalities) are relatively solid because they often rest on firsthand reports about bodies actually seen. Figures about missing are less reliable. They tend to be secondhand and refer to large groups (or entire boats) that simply disappear.
UNHCR
UNHCR figures are regularly cited by the media, governments and NGOs. They are of a global nature and do not distinguish between missing and dead. On 29 September, the UNHCR spoke of 2'000 casualties, a figure also mentioned in early December. At about the same time the organization published more detailed figures. They cover five world regions, amongst them the Mediterranean. The numbers used by UNHCR - like mine - are media-based, but the report is somewhat special because it focuses on "Selected Distress at Sea Incidents involving Refugees and Migrants in 2011". By naming "selected" cases only, the account does not pretend to be complete. And by investigating "distress at sea" incidents it mentions cases with no casualties at all. Based on this report it is impossible to tell how the UNHCR arrives at 2'000 casualties.
FORTRESS EUROPE
The effort undertaken by Fortress Europe is different. It is a web-page (or a blog) run by Gabriele del Grande that concentrates on Mediterranean victims, dates back to 1988 and distinguishes between missing and dead. For the year 2011, and for the Central Mediterranean, the author speaks of 1'822 victims. This figure does not fully square with the entries on his list. A careful look at the register shows 41 incidents for the Central Mediterranean, with a total of 2'096 victims (1712 missing and 384 dead). Whatever the exact number, the figure of victims is certainly much higher than in earlier years. For the past ten years, as Fortress Europe indicates, the average number was around 430.
|
2010 |
2009 |
2008 |
2007 |
2006 |
2005 |
2004 |
2003 |
2002 |
|
20 |
425 |
1'274 |
556 |
302 |
437 |
206 |
413 |
236 |
Gabriele del Grande also shows that the way from Libya is more dangerous than the Tunisian route: One in seventy-five migrants never makes it from Tunisia, but it is one in seventeen that fails to arrive from Libya.
COMPARISON
Both Fortress Europe totals (1'822 and 2'096) contrast with my own. I arrive at 1'182 victims or 988 missing and 194 dead. The difference is sizeable, between 650 and 900, roughly speaking. The gap is less substantial when we realize that some of the larger incidents happened in April and May. It was a time when the Gaddafi regime forcibly expelled around 13'000 sub-Saharan Africans. The situation was turbulent, and the reports often unreliable and overlapping. Let me mention some examples and show that they account for more than half of the discrepancy.
MISSING
Between 3 and 13 April, three boats with a total of 1'120 migrants were reported missing off Libya. A careful reading of the reports suggests that they might overlap. I decided to count one vessel with 370 missing, Fortress Europe selected two with 750 missing. On 28 April, Fortress Europe reports 330 missing in an accident off Libya. No other accounts of this case can be found. Gabriele del Grande names a single eyewitness (and himself) as a source! The two examples, taken together, add up to 530 missing, which reduces the gap substantially.
DEAD
On 3 April, Fortress Europe reports 68 dead near Tripoli, citing a television station as a source. At about the same time Fortress Europe claims that 27 Tunisians had died in mid-March and refers to a report I cannot find. The two incidents, taken together, account for 95 dead and cuts the difference in half.
Still, all discrepancies cannot be eliminated. It is true that my count may be conservative, whereas the figures of Fortress Europe (and of the UNHCR) appear to be high. Whatever the exact numbers, it is a miracle that over 95% of those who undertook the perilous journey to Europe managed to arrive.
INCIDENT RESPONSIBILITY
As mentioned in my chronology, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), on 23 June, appointed a special rapporteur to investigate and clarify the fate of boatpeople crossing the Central Mediterranean. On 30 November, the rapporteur held a hearing in Paris. From what we read in the press she is interested in determining the responsibility for a major incident off Libya in late March and early April, a case involving NATO. The reason, I presume, is an attempt to formulate recommendations for improved Search and Rescue cooperation in the future. It is not by coincidence that the rapporteur is interested in those Spring days of 2011. They were chaotic indeed and it is to be hoped that her investigation helps to eliminate some of the prevailing uncertainties. (PACE report 29.3.12.)
Part IV - PROBLEMS
PROBLEMS
There are "blue" and there are "green" borders - maritime and land borders. Some problems the two have in common, but there are issues that separate them and that are typical of one or the other. This section begins with a few words about the difficulties they share. But, given the main focus of this web-site, I will then highlight a dozen problems typical of maritime borders and that migrants are likely to encounter when crossing the Central Mediterranean. To illustrate the difficulties examples of the year 2011 will be mentioned.
COMMON PROBLEMS
The problems commonly encountered by migrants are well-known. They have been studied by research institutes, International Organizations, NGOs and governments. Such investigations discuss the "push and pull" factors driving modern migrants, the general problems they run into when crossing borders and the issues typical of "mixed migration".
In 2011, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) presented a particularly relevant report on boatpeople and on the post-arrival problems they encounter in Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece. The focus is on identification, status differentiation, legal counsel and protection. Special attention is paid to vulnerable persons like minors, victims of trafficking and of torture. The study also mentions possible solutions involving the European Union and the Council of Europe. The publication is highly pertinent but, by concentrating on post-arrival issues, the problems typical of blue border migration are not discussed.
BLUE-BORDER PROBLEMS
At times, the Mediterranean is relatively easy to cross; thousands make it without running into major problems. But the journey can be difficult; tragedies are common. In 2011, around 1500 boatpeople must have died. Search and Rescue (SAR) operations are therefore a central and typical aspect of blue border management.
Unfortunately, there are few informative and publicly available reports about such operations. Only the Times of Malta, based mostly on information supplied by the Armed Forces of Malta (AFM), makes it a habit to publish detailed accounts. Neither the Italian government nor FRONTEX supply us with comparable information. The reports illustrating the twelve problem areas discussed below are therefore Maltese. They are referred to in brackets and reproduced under Documents.
(1) DESTINATIONS & ROUTES
Short routes are relatively safe; most accidents occur on longer routes. – Another factor for choosing Lampedusa is more political. When landing on this island there is a high probability that migrants end up on the European continent. When arriving in Malta, that is unlikely. ICMC interviews of migrants confirm this fact: "Only 6% of those interviewed said that Malta had been their intended destination. Almost all stated that they had been hoping to arrive in another European country" (p. 68).
(2) DEPARTURES
In 2011, the reasons for leaving Libya and Tunisia varied, and the problems did, too. The Gaddafi government, to "flood" Europe with refugees, forcibly expelled thousands of sub-Saharan Africans. Others decided to flee from the on-going civil war. It meant the de facto end of the 2008 Italian-Libyan "Friendship Agreement" and the unfortunate "push-back" policy. It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that most of the 1500 victims were sub-Saharan Africans. The Tunisian situation was different. Young men, taking advantage of temporary governmental inactivity, departed for mainly economic reasons. Migrant interviews show that both in Libya and Tunisia migrant smugglers facilitate departures and demand around 1000 USD per person and trip.
(3) VESSELS
The use of engine-driven fishing boats is common, but some migrants travel in rubber dinghies or in private sailing boats [9 April, 11/14 November]. Given the large number of boats arriving there seems to be no shortage of supply and possibly some form of organized trade. The size and the quality of fishing boats can vary greatly. Many are small and in precarious shape. Engine problems and leaks are relatively frequent. Navigation, by contrast, seems to be a minor problem. This is surprising given the fact that most migrants have no maritime experience.
(4) DISTRESS
A frequent reason for distress (and for capsizing) is overcrowding, especially in rough seas [6/7 April]. Technical problems include engine failures [9 April, 30 May, 11 June, 14 July], gas shortages [6/7 April], rudder problems [9 May] and leaks [8/9 April, 1 May]. There are also cases of disorientation [9/13/29 May, 11 November]. Medical problems include dehydration, asphyxiation and pregnancies. Actual distress can be difficult to identify [8/9 May]. Is a request for gas a case of distress, and what is the appropriate reaction? Is a leak real or an excuse for getting help [2 May]? Should such boats be intercepted and rescued or simply surveilled and escorted [1/8/9/13 May, 11 June]?
(5) DETECTION & COMMUNICATION
Migrants tend to employ modern means of communication. The use of satellite phones becomes more and more common [6/30 April, 13 May, 11 November]. Such gadgets can facilitate SAR operations, but they can also complicate matters because messages may arrive from different quarters. Some migrants contact SAR Coordination Centers directly [6 April, 11/14 November], but many calls are indirect. SAR coordinators may be informed by friends of migrants living in North Africa, in Europe or in detention facilities [6/7 April]. They may also get calls from radio stations [14 November] or commercial and military ships [11 June]. Another information source is systematic SAR monitoring and air surveillance [13 May, 11 June]. Along the Italian coast, and to prevent criminal trafficking, the Guardia di Finanza engages in systematic interception and policing. The multitude of actors and communication channels demands careful coordination.
(6) SAR REGIONS & COORDINATION
The obligation for coordination lies with the various Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCC). They are constituent parts of Maritime Search and Rescue Regions (MSRR). Both centers and regions are regulated by international law, the SOLAS (or Safety of Life at Sea) Convention of 1974 and the SAR (or Hamburg) Convention of 1979 [30 May, 4 June, 14/15 July]. It often happens that one state manages coordination and that a different state handles the rescue [29/30 May, 1/11 June, 11 November]. It is not uncommon for SAR units (Coast guard boats, helicopters and airplanes) to be assisted by military ships [13/14 May, 11 June, 14 July, 11/14 November] and by private fishing [6 April] and merchant vessels [30 April, 1 May].
(7) MEDITERRANEAN SAR REGIONS
Malta has a huge SAR Region [8 April]. Virtually all boatpeople pass through it, and the island of Lampedusa is located within the Maltese region. Malta is thus the Central Mediterranean's chief coordinator – but not its chief rescuer! The reason is that most incidents are closer to Italy (Lampedusa), Libya and Tunisia and that all three countries have more rescue assets than Malta [8 April]. The interplay of coordination and of rescue can be complicated, particularly when units of the US 6th Fleet, NATO and FRONTEX are involved [6/7/30 April, 1/13/14 May, 11 June, 11 November]. Concerted action is called for – but it can also fail.
(8) COORDINATION/RESCUE DISPUTES
Italy accuses Malta with some regularity of "neglecting its obligations". Italy maintains that the Maltese, within their SAR Region, are responsible for both coordination and rescue, even in cases where boats are closer to Lampedusa than to Malta. The Maltese disagree. They argue that the "nearest" vessel (commercial and governmental) is responsible for rescue, and that persons rescued must be taken to the "nearest" place of safety (or port of call) [7/8/9 April, 30 May, June 1/4]. Both states claim that their positions are grounded in international maritime law (i.e. the SOLAS and SAR Conventions). As a number of incidents show, such disputes ultimately revolve around the issue of disembarkation.
(9) COORDINATION/RESCUE INCIDENTS
In 2011, the two legal positions, and the issue of disembarkation, were at the core of several incidents. Some cases, involving Italy and Malta directly, were limited to mutual accusations [7/8/19 April, 29/30 May, 1/7/9 June]; other cases had political and diplomatic consequences [19 April, 1/2/3 May, 30 May/1 June]. In two instances Italy retaliated by blocking the disembarkation of migrants rescued by Maltese SAR units [9/19 April]. In two cases it was the UNHCR that accused Malta of neglecting its duties [10 May, 14 November]. At one point a Spanish NATO ship was caught in a complicated disembarkation tangle at the end of which the migrants were taken to Tunisia [14/15 July].
(10) RESCUE
Rescues can be difficult, especially in rough seas. Collisions, panics, stampedes and capsizing must be avoided. Cautious transfers, including the use of rubber dinghies, are often a necessity [6/7/9 April]. When mid-sea transfers are impossible life jackets and life boats may have to be dropped from the air [6/7 April]. Helicopters are used to handle medical emergencies. There are also reports about rescue refusals. Help by fishermen and merchant ships is rare because, unfortunately, they face various types of disincentives. The same may be true of military vessels. The British Guardian blamed NATO for neglecting its rescue obligations off Libya at the end of March. To investigate the accusations a committee of the European Council's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) appointed a special rapporteur [8/9/10 May].
(11) SAR ASSETS
The assets available for SAR operations are unevenly distributed. Italy, with its well-equipped Guardia Costiera and Guardia di Finanza, is in a position to muster a respectable number of boats and airplanes. The Tunisian and Libyan navies, too, possess a fair number of ships. In comparison, Malta's assets are modest – one off-shore patrol boat and only a handful of in-shore boats and airplanes. That, however, does not prevent the AFM from operating in their entire SAR region [30 April]. Although the total number of assets existing in the Central Mediterranean is respectable, actual availability can be a problem, especially when several rescues have to be conducted simultaneously [7/30 April, 13 May, 1 June].
(12) DISEMBARKATION
The SOLAS and the SAR Conventions do not mention disembarkation. They merely state that the persons rescued must be taken to a "place of safety". It is the 2004 amendments to the SAR Convention (including the relevant Guidelines and a 2009 Circular) that mention disembarkation explicitly – but without settling the issue of responsibility. States are merely urged "to cooperate" in determining an appropriate place of disembarkation [June 4]. Italy accepts the 2004 amendments; Malta rejects them [8 April]. Malta also rejects the FRONTEX guidelines which stipulate that disembarkation is the responsibility of the state "hosting a mission". The legal gap remains: There is a sacrosanct duty to rescue, but there is no corresponding duty to receive the persons rescued.
Part V - SOLUTIONS
SOLUTIONS
Problems call for solutions. Some blue-border problems can be handled unilaterally by the governments concerned. Lampedusa is an example where the Italian government is primarily called upon to act. The fight against trafficking, too, is largely a national domain. Other problems call for multilateral action. Examples are improvements in SAR cooperation, the resolution of disembarkation disputes or the provision of sufficient rescue assets.
In numerous cases the involvement of international organizations like the UNHCR or the IMO is also required. Many solutions are therefore a combination of national, bilateral and multilateral measures. And, unfortunately, some answers are partial and unsatisfactory rather than comprehensive and sustainable. The discussion that follows builds, once again, on the 2011 events enumerated earlier and is no effort to be truly comprehensive.
EUROPE
First and foremost, workable solutions have to involve the nations on both sides of the Mediterranean, but the role of the European Union is also important. Blue-border management must be an all-European concern. So far, the Union's reaction is disappointing. Cecilia Malmström, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, is candid about this. In early 2012, she published an article in the Times of Malta summarizing the EU's refugee performance. Its title: "How Europe Failed"! The need for solidarity, she says, is on everyone's lips but there is a minimum of corresponding action.
LAMPEDUSA
To declare Lampedusa an "unsafe port" is no solution. Italy cannot prevent immigrants from heading for this island. In the short run a national solution must be found. At the very least, the Italian government has to provide ferries for orderly relocation. In addition, the reception facilities must be repaired to handle a regular flow of migrants; which should help to prevent protests and riots. Similar recommendations are part of a report published on 30 September by a special Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE).
If necessary, Italy can count on FRONTEX support. In the Spring of 2011, the organization sent specialists from other Schengen countries to help with the screening and debriefing of migrants. Their main task was to gather information about national origin and organized trafficking.
REPATRIATION
Another Italian problem to be eliminated is wholesale air repatriation. The arrangement seems to be part of an agreement Silvio Berlusconi signed on 6 April with the new Tunisian government. On 1 May, Italy announced that the scheme was working. Return flights were kept secret – by both governments. Only the large air operations following the September Lampedusa riots could not be kept under cover. It is not uncommon for European governments to sign bilateral migration agreements regulating repatriation. But, in many cases, the arrangement is made public. The details of the April 6 agreement, however, are unknown.
PUSH-BACK
The war in Libya meant the de facto end of Italy's contoversial push-back policy. The conflict ended in October but, as early as 17 June, the Berlusconi government signed a new migration agreement with the NTC. No details were published. On 23 August, and again on 3 October, Italy took another step and announced its intention to "update" the Friendship Agreement of 2008. The new Foreign Minister, Giulio Terzi, followed suit. He, too, called for a "reactivation" of the 2008 treaty.
On 6 December, the Libyan provisional government (NTC) declared its willingness to pursue a migration policy "different" from past. It is to be hoped that the new arrangement will end indiscriminate push-back activities and collective expulsion. Future agreements should be in conformity with international law, most particularly with the recent ECtHR decision in the case of "Hirsi v. Italy". And, to really improve the lot of migrants, new agreement with Libya and Tunisia must address the problem of migrant smuggling.
DISEMBARKATION
Disembarkation disputes interfere with a proper functioning of SAR operations and must be eliminated. In the short run, an amicable solution between Italy and Malta might help. But a permanent solution demands changes in international maritime law. To alter the SOLAS Convention is no simple matter. To obtain a universal consensus within the International Maritime Organization can take years. A lasting solution of the disembarkation dispute is not in sight. In the meantime, other and more indirect measures can help.
RESETTLEMENT
Resettlement efforts by UNHCR and IOM are an example. Since 2005, close to 1500 migrants have been relocated from Malta, over 800 of which went to the US, the rest to Canada and Europe. Those profiting are mainly from war-torn countries like Somalia and Eritrea. In conformity with international conventions they are granted international protection (or asylum) because their security is endangered at home. Relocations help to ease Maltese worries about too many migrants arriving at their shores.
EUREMA
Another resettlement effort is intra-European. In 2009, the EU Commission initiated a program called EUREMA (European Relocation Malta). It met with some success. By the end of 2011, 360 refugees have been resettled. At the most recent pledging conference in May 2011, thirteen EU countries declared their readiness to accept Maltese asylum seekers. Two non-EU countries, Norway and Switzerland, also participate. EUREMA was started because the EU was unable to activate the Refugee Solidarity Mechanism under the Council's 2001 Temporary Protection Directive. Prompted by Maltese insistence, the Commission launched EUREMA as a voluntary pilot project, hoping it might become part of a more comprehensive scheme.
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
A more comprehensive resettlement scheme is in the making - as part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). As early as 1999, the European Council agreed to establish a common asylum system based on the full application of the Geneva (UNHCR) Convention of 1951. Simply put, the objective is to harmonize 27 different asylum policies and to implement a general scheme of burden-sharing. The arrangement is broadly conceived and ambitious. Over the years, the EU has created a number of legal and financial instruments. Much remains to be done, however. A joint resettlement scheme is planned for the year 2012 - but may be difficult to realize.
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE
A recently established component of the future asylum system is the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The agency was set up in June 2011, with headquarters in Valletta, Malta. Its task, as the name indicates, is to support national governments in the implementation of common asylum standards, accompanied by training and related activities. The assistance provided should improve asylum procedures in general. EASO's impact on disembarkation is at best indirect, of course.
FRONTEX
In 2011, the EU also decided to strengthen FRONTEX. On 23 June, Council and Parliament agreed on a number of improvements in the areas of mission management, personnel recruitment, equipment, training, human rights protection and accountability. The intention is to make FRONTEX a more effective instrument to ease the burden of individual countries. Push-back practices will be abandoned. To guarantee the respect for basic rights future FRONTEX missions will be monitored by a fundamental rights officer.
Unfortunately, the disembarkation rules remain unchanged. FRONTEX regulations still demand that rescued persons be disembarked in the country "hosting" a joint operation. For Malta this is unacceptable. It did not host a FRONTEX mission in 2011, and neither did its naval units participate in missions hosted by other countries. In early March, FRONTEX director Ilkka Laitinen visited Malta for discussions – with no results. Changing the Dublin "first country" rule could be a useful step. It would ease the burden on smaller countries located at the external "Schengen" border. For the moment this is unlikely.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
The Council of Europe also became active. Based on a report dated 1 June, the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) adopted a resolution on 21 June dealing with important issues of blue-border migration. The main focus is on "Interception and Rescue at Sea of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Irregular Migrants". A number of problem areas are discussed, in particular the rescue obligation, the non-refoulement principle, disembarkation rules and the need for solidarity. The resolution also formulates a handful of recommendations. As is to be expected, these are predominantly a reminder of the legal obligations members have entered into.
As mentioned above, a special PACE committee did an investigation on the situation at Lampedusa. In June, the same committee appointed a rapporteur to investigate the "lives lost in the Mediterranean since January 2011" and to determine legal responsibilities. In the meantime it became apparent that the rapporteur is concentrating her efforts on a single incident – the alleged refusal of NATO ships to rescue boatpeople in distress off Libya in late March. The results are not yet out. Most likely this effort, too, will end by reminding states of their legal duties.